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1The prin ci pal objec ti ve of this pa per is to draw at ten tion 
to the need for the Mi nistry of Fi nan ce (MF) to start 
ma na ging the cash and liqui dity of the Croa tian Bud get 
in or der to re strain and slow down the growth in short-
term pu blic debt. For this rea son in the sequel we shall 
put forward the ba sic prin ci ples and objec ti ves, ex plain 
the pro blems and the in sti tu tio nal chan ges, and the exi-
sting si tua tion in the ma na ge ment of cash and liqui dity. 
The conc lu sion will sta te the main bar riers, the po ssi ble 
pro blems and pro po sals for a high qua lity cash and liqui-
dity ma na ge ment for the Croa tian bud get.
What is bud get cash and liqui dity 
ma na ge ment?
Cash flow ma na ge ment is a func tion of the Sta te Trea-
sury thro ugh which the MF se cu res con trol of cash 
flows via the sy stem of the Sin gle Ac co unt of the Trea-
sury (SAT) in do me stic and fo reign cur rency and the 
cen tra li sa tion of de po sits of the na tio nal bud get and the 
EBF [Ex tra-Bud ge tary Funds] in the SAT at the cen tral 
bank. As part of liqui dity ma na ge ment, the MF, via the 
Sta te Trea sury sy stem, can carry out in ter nal ope ra tions 
that re la te to pro vi ding the most fa vo u ra ble terms for 
short-term bor rowing and fi nan cing of the bud get, in ve-
sting bud ge tary sur plu ses in the mo ney mar ket, ma king 
loans to bud ge tary spen ding agen cies and kee ping de po-
sits in com mer cial banks at the best ra te of in te rest.
In ma na ging cash flow, the MF con trols SAT in flows 
and out flows, as well as col lec tions and pay ments. This 
con trol does not co ver only bud ge tary re ve nue and 
ex pen di tu re, but al so out go ing and in co ming pay ments 
that are per for med via the EBFs. The prin ci pal aim of 
cash flow and liqui dity ma na ge ment is con trol of ove rall 
go vern ment spen ding, ef fec ti ve im ple men ta tion of the 
bud get and mi ni mi sing the costs of bor rowing, in ve sting 
sur plu ses on the mo ney mar ket and the or derly mee ting 
of lia bi li ties. For cash flow and liqui dity ma na ge ment, 
the most essen tial thing is to ma ke su re that go vern ment 
in sti tu tions ope ra te via the SAT, to en su re that a pro per 
pay ments clea ring sy stem is ope ra ted by the banks, and 
or derly pay ment of the go vern ment’s lia bi li ties.
Ini tial con straints and in sti tu tio nal 
chan ges in pay ments clea ring
Up un til 2001, the main pro blems in ma na ging cash 
flow and liqui dity in Croa tia con si sted of: 1. pay ments 
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clea ring that was frag men ted among go vern ment ac co-
unts ad mi ni ste red by ZAP (In sti tu te of Pay ments); 2. fai-
lu re of ope ra tions to be car ried out via the SAT (do me-
stic and fo reign cur rency); 3. se pa ra te ac co unts of bud-
ge tary spen ding agen cies (re gu lar bu si ness and de po sit 
ac co unts) in com mer cial banks; 4. pay ments clea ring 
was not car ried out by the banks; 5. the MF did not ha ve 
any over view of the “pu re” cash flows1; 6. the unk nown 
ba lan ces of the (do me stic and fo reign cur rency) de po-
sits of  bud gets; 7. the unk nown num ber of bud ge tary 
ac co unts in com mer cial banks.
Howe ver, chan ges we re ma de in the bud ge tary sy stem, 
and sin ce 2001 the si tua tion has been im pro ving; both 
the MF and the CNB [Croa tian Na tio nal Bank] can 
su per vi se and con trol cash flows in the ac co unts of spen-
ding agen cies. Thus the Go vern ment, in coo pe ra tion 
with the MF and the CNB, between 2001 and 2005, 
took se ve ral key steps that pro vi ded the in sti tu tio nal 
pre mi ses for the ma na ge ment of cash flow and liqui dity 
and ma de it po ssi ble for the MF to fi gu re on the mo ney 
mar ket with sur plus bud ge tary re so ur ces at the end of 
the day (ta ble 1).
Ta ble 1  In sti tu tio nal chan ges in Croa tia (pre con di-
tions for cash flow and liqui dity ma na ge-
ment) sin ce 2001
Chan ge Year Objec ti ve
1 Re form of the ku napay ments clea ring 2001
Exe cu tion of pay ments 
clea ring in the banks
2 Ban on go vern mentbor rowing at the CNB 2001
Ma king fi nan cing from 
pri mary emi ssion
im po ssi ble
3
Im pro ve ment of fo reign 
cur rency pay ments
clea ring in go vern ment 
ac co unts
2003
Per for man ce of fo reign 
cur rency pay ments
clea ring in the CNB
4 Con trol of na tio nalbud get lia bi li ties 2001
Ma king su re of fi scal 
di sci pli ne and or derly
exe cu tion of the bud get
5 Sin gle Ac co unt of the Trea sury – ku na 2001
Cen tra li sa tion of bud get 
cash flows and de po sits in 
the SAT at the CNB
6
Sin gle Ac co unt of the 
Trea sury – fo reign
cur rency
2003
Cen tra li sa tion of fo reign 
cur rency de po sits of the 
go vern ment in the
Sin gle Fo reign Cur rency 
Ac co unt of the Trea sury 
(SF CAT)
Thanks to the se in sti tu tio nal chan ges, sin ce 2001 the MF 
has been able, for the first ti me, to con trol the fi nan cial 
ope ra tions of in sti tu tions that it fi nan ces from the na tio-
nal bud get, for in co ming pay ments and out go ing pay-
ments are ma de via the Sin gle Ac co unt of the Trea sury 
(do me stic and fo reign cur rency) at the CNB. Pay ments 
clea ring has been hand led by the com mer cial banks sin-
ce 2001, and in ad di tion, in 2003 the CNB took over 
the fo reign cur rency pay ments for go vern ment ac co unts 
clea ring from the com mer cial banks.
Pay ments clea ring for go vern ment ac co unts 
(in co ming and out go ing pay ments)
FI NA (Fi nan cial Agency, the for mer ZAP) went on 
per for ming ku na pay ments clea ring even af ter 2001 
on be half and at the ex pen se of the go vern ment and 
went on char ging the go vern ment a fee for the jobs it 
did. From 2001 on, the main chan ge in the go vern ment 
fi nan ces has been in the way con tri bu tions (for pen sions 
and health in su ran ce) ha ve been paid and the ma jo rity 
of own re ve nues that spen ding agen cies co uld in de pen-
dently di spo se of in the SAT. But wit hin the in co ming 
pay ment of own re ve nues the re we re still ex cep tions2. 
Still, from 2003, the MF for the first ti me had the ca pa-
city to keep daily watch on the dy na mics of the in flow 
of most of the re ve nue in to the SAT. In pa ral lel with the 
cen tra li sa tion of in co ming pay ments the MF cen trally 
per forms most out go ing pay ments from the SAT. Thus 
the MF (cen tral Trea sury) can ef fec ti vely re strict cash 
flows from the SAT up to the mo ment when they are 
requi red. In the new ope ra tio nal sy stem via the SAT 
spen ding agen cies re mit requi re ments for pay ment to 
their own mi nistry (lo cal trea sury), the mi ni stries (the 
lo cal trea su ries) pre pa re se rial pay ments and apply for 
bulk set tle ment from the cen tral Trea sury in the MF. 
Af ter that the MF tran sfers funds from the SAT to the 
ac co unts of spen ding agen cies in the Croa tian Po stal 
Bank (CPB) or (most frequently) from the SAT di rectly 
to the com mer cial banks pur suant to in vo i ces re cei ved 
and aut ho ri sed. So me of the pay ments (ma te rial costs 
and wa ges bills of the spen ding agen cies) are car ried 
1 Since 2002 the Money Flows Management Department in the MF, pursu-
ant to records of FINA revenues, has separated cash flows of pure revenue 
from receipts from short-term and long-term borrowing, treasury bills and 
foreign currency revenue and receipts.  By separating out the cash flows of 
revenue the MF can determine what the expectations are from the so-called 
pure revenue (without receipts from borrowing) and the amount of borrow-
ing necessary, or alternately the ability to invest in the event that there is a 
positive cash flow (i.e. a surplus).
2 Although the size of transactions via the SAT has increased, individual 
cash transactions are still carried out from accounts managed by spending 
agencies in commercial banks. According to the Law on Central Govern-
ment Budget Execution for 2005 (the Paragraph 35, Official Gazette No. 
171/04), although they meet material costs and wages bill from the SAT, 
outside of the treasury are spending agencies from science, higher educa-
tion, health, justice, social securities, culture, diplomat-consular represen-
tative, state inventories, system of penitentiary institutions and Ministry of 
Justice. These institutions are included in operations via the SAT only for 
their revenue and expenditure, which are financed from the central budget. 
The spending agencies spend their own revenues to cover expenditure, and 
their deposits are kept in accounts at commercial banks. (Naturally, the bal-
ance of deposits from their own revenues is in the sphere of the commercial 
banks, and is not inside the SAT system of collection and payment.)
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out by the MF via ac co unts in the CPB that are tran sac-
tion ac co unts, the ba lan ce held in the ac co unts being 
ze ro. Po ten tial sur plu ses are tran sfer red to de po sit ac co-
unts in the CPB. The ac co unt and ba lan ce on de po sit in 
the CPB be long to the SAT in the CNB and are an in te-
gral part of it.  
Be ca u se of the im pro ve ments and the en lar ge ment of 
the co ve ra ge of fi nan cial tran sac tions via the SAT, the 
MF has an over view of and con trol of most of the fi nan-
cial tran sac tions of ge ne ral go vern ment (which con sist 
of the na tio nal bud get, the EBFs and the lo cal units). 
Thus the first pre mi se for the ma na ge ment of cash flow 
and liqui dity has been pro vi ded for wit hin the MF – the 
fi nan cial ope ra tions of spen ding agen cies ta ke pla ce wit-
hin the sy stem of the do me stic and fo reign cur rency 
SAT in the CNB.
Con so li da tion of bud gets
Thanks to the con so li da tion of the bud gets, in which the 
big gest EBFs (the pen sions and the health ca re) we re inc-
lu ded in the na tio nal bud get, the MF has been able sin ce 
2002 to mo ni tor and ma na ge the re ve nue and ex pen di tu-
re of the na tio nal bud get cen trally (graph 1). 
Up to 2001 the MF di rectly con trol led abo ut 40% of 
the ex pen di tu re of ge ne ral go vern ment, but from 2002 
the Go vern ment and the MF ha ve in crea sed the sco pe 
of fi nan cial tran sac tions wit hin the na tio nal bud get to 
abo ut 80% of the ex pen di tu res of ge ne ral go vern ment. 
Thus the MF has ac hie ved the se cond pre mi se for the 
ma na ge ment of cash flow and liqui dity – the cen tra l iza-
tion of the fi nan cial ope ra tions of most of the in sti tu-
tions of go vern ment wit hin the na tio nal go vern ment.
Out stan ding lia bi li ties
Only sin ce 2000 has the MF con trol led out stan ding lia-
bi li ties of bud ge tary spen ding agen cies (ta ble 2).  Not, 
it is true, com ple tely, for in sti tu tions from the health ca-
re sy stem do not meet their lia bi li ties in the an ti ci pa ted 
pe riods and the MF is obli ged to pro vi de col la te ral by 
the issue of long-term bonds, which thus in crea ses the 
pu blic debt.
Ta ble 2  Out stan ding lia bi li ties of the na tio nal bud-
get, si tua tion as of the end of the pe riod 
(in mil lion ku na)
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1.  Bro ught forward from 
pre vio us year – 1,236 147 123 101 –
2.  New lia bi li ties in
the cur rent year: – 2,043 359   442 313 1,290
a) HZ ZO [Health 
Fund] lia bi li ties    316 500 1,062
b) HZ MO [Pen sion 
Fund] lia bi li ties    126  42 1
c) ot her spen ding agen-
cies’ lia bi li ties 227
3.  To tal out stan ding
lia bi li ties (1+2) 9,586 3,279 506 565 956 1,290
So ur ce: IMF and MF Re pu blic of Croa tia 2005 
It can be seen that of the 9.5 bil lion of out stan ding lia bi-
li ties at the end of 1999, 506 mil lion ku na re mai ned in 
2001. Howe ver, when the EBFs, for health ca re and pen-
sions, we re inc lu ded in the bud ge tary sy stem, out stan-
ding lia bi li ties of the na tio nal bud get in crea sed to 956 
mil lion ku na in 2003 and 1.3 bil lion ku na in 2004. It sho-
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Graph 1  Ex pen di tu re of the na tio nal bud get as pro por tion of ex pen di tu re of the bud get of ge ne ral 
go vern ment between 1994 and 2004 (in %)
So ur ce: MF Re pu blic of Croa tia, 2005
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uld be po in ted out that sin ce 2001 the MF, at first quar-
terly and then monthly, has con trol led the out stan ding 
lia bi li ties of all spen ding agen cies and has thus at tai ned 
the third pre con di tion for cash flow and liqui dity ma na-
ge ment – su per vi sion and con trol of lia bi li ties. Of co ur-
se, the issue of the or derly set tle ment of out stan ding 
lia bi li ties of spen ding agen cies, mainly the in sti tu tions 
from the health ca re sy stem, still re mains.
Playing with go vern ment de po sits
A key issue is whet her the MF can ma na ge the short-
term liquid funds of the bud get. In or der to esta blish 
this, we sho uld look at the ba lan ce of de po sits of cen tral 
go vern ment (the na tio nal bud get and the EBFs) in the 
CNB and the amo unt of short-term loans of the CNB 
to go vern ment (graph 2).
De po sits of the na tio nal bud get in the CNB ha ve in crea-
sed from 930 mil lion ku na in 1995 to 1.2 bil lion ku na 
in 2005. The sta te has oc ca sio nally bor rowed from the 
CNB, mainly in 1999. In te re stingly eno ugh, in spi te of 
the exi sten ce of avai la ble short-term liquid funds and 
de po sits, be ca u se of the lack of any cash and liqui dity 
ma na ge ment, up to 2001 the MF on the who le took 
loans for the pur po ses of liqui dity from the CNB, and 
from go vern ment in sti tu tions as well3. The pro hi bi tion 
of bor rowing at the CNB from 20014 ga ve the MF the 
op por tu nity in de pen dently to ma na ge de po sits and liqui-
dity and to par ti ci pa te in the mo ney mar ket with bud ge-
tary sur plu ses or to bor row by di rect loans from com-
mer cial banks, clearly an un pro pi tio us op tion.
Thanks to the ope ra tions in and con so li da tion of funds 
in the SAT, from 2001 the avai la ble de po sits of the 
go vern ment bud get in the CNB ha ve in crea sed. Sin ce 
April 2003 the ba lan ce of de po sits has in crea sed thanks 
to the mo ve of fo reign cur rency pay ments and de po sits 
to the single foreign currency account of the treasury 
(SFCAT) at the CNB. Howe ver, still, most of the fi nan-
cial assets of cen tral go vern ment (mainly de po sits) are 
im mo bi li sed in com mer cial banks. This is shown by the 
fi gu res in the graph 3.
To tal de po sits of cen tral go vern ment in crea sed from 2.9 
bil lion ku na in 1995 to 8.3 bil lion ku na in 2005. Thus 
the MF, in col la bo ra tion with the CNB, cen tra li sed or 
in crea sed the amo unt of de po sits of the na tio nal bud get 
in the SAT (fo reign and do me stic cur rency) from 396 
mil lion ku na in 1995 to 1.5 bil lion ku na in 2005. Howe-
ver, the lar gest part of cen tral go vern ment de po sits are 
in the com mer cial banks, in crea sing from 1.8 bil lion in 
1995 to as much as 6.8 bil lion ku na in 2005. This re fers 
pri ma rily to EBF de po sits, which when the two lar gest 
EBFs we re mo ved in to the na tio nal bud get did not re du-
ce but we re ac tually in crea sed. Still, for a mo re de tai led 
in sight in to the ina bi lity of the MF to con trol de po sits of 
the go vern ment in the com mer cial banks and to ma na ge 
them, one sho uld look at the ta ble 3 con cer ning the amo-
unt and struc tu re of ge ne ral go vern ment de po sits.
Ge ne ral go vern ment de po sits thus in crea sed from 8.7 
bil lion in 2000 to 10.3 bil lion ku na in 2005. Most of the-
se go vern ment de po sits, which in crea sed from 2.7 bil-
lion in 2000 to as much as 5.2 bil lion in 2005, are pla-
Graph 2 De po sits and short-term loans of the na tio nal bud get in the CNB, 1994-2005 (in bil lion ku na)
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So ur ce: CNB, 2005
3 For example, with ZAP, shipbuilding, the Tax Aministration and the City 
of Zagreb.
4 The Croatian National Bank Law, OG 36/01
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ced in com mer cial banks, mainly the ti me de po sits of 
the EBFs that the MF can not use in the way of fi nan cial 
po ten tial to be in ve sted on the mo ney mar ket, nor can it 
af fect, by the supply of the se funds, the amo unt of in te-
rest ra tes that are for med on the mo ney mar ket ac cor-
ding to supply and de mand (daily and over night).  Un for-
tu na tely, li ke the EBFs’, lo cal go vern ment unit de po sits 
(which in crea sed from 967 bil lion in 2000 to abo ut 2.6 
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Graph 3  Cen tral go vern ment de po sits (of the na tio nal bud get and the EBFs) in the CNB and in com-
mer cial banks from 1993 to 2005 (in bil lion ku na)
DCG – to tal de po sits of cen tral go vern ment
So ur ce: CNB 2005
DCG CNB – de po sits of cen tral go vern ment in the CNB
DCG banks – de po sits of cen tral go vern ment in the com mer cial 
banks
Ta ble 3  Amo unt and struc tu re of ge ne ral go vern-
ment de po sits from 2000 to 2005 (in
mil lion ku na)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 012005
1.  Cen tral bud get 
de po sits 5,033 4,136 3,143 2,007 1,564 2,505
Short term 2,380 1,970 1,312 992 795 1,823
Ti me de po sits 2,654 2,166 1,831 1,015 769 682
2. EBF 2,706 3,251 3,560 3,716 5,592 5,231
Short term 185 436 706 413 531 526
Ti me de po sits 2,521 2,815 2,854 3,303 5,060 4,704
3. Lo cal units 967 1,381 2,430 2,591 2,592 2,587
Short term 728 1,039 1,937 2,035 2,041 1,963
Ti me de po sits 239 342 492 555 551 625
4.  Ge ne ral go vern-
ment (1+2+3) 8,706 8,768 9,133 8,313 9,748 10,322
Short term 3,293 3,444 3,956 3,440 3,367 4,312
Ti me de po sits 5,413 5,324 5,177 4,873 6,380 6,011
De po sits in fi nan cial 
in sti tu tions (a + b) 8,706 8,768 9,133 8,313 9,748 10,322
a) CNB 1,009 1,752 608 440 334 1,456
b) Banks 7,697 7,016 8,525 7,874 9,414 8,867
NB: for 2005, the fi gu res re la te to the si tua tion as of Ja nuary 31
Source: CNB, 2005
bil lion in 2005) are out si de the SAT sy stem (and out si de 
the go vern men tal fi nan cial in for ma tion sy stem) in the 
com mer cial banks, and the MF can not af fect them or 
ma ke objec ti ve de ci sions abo ut the amo unt of grants to 
al lo ca te to lo cal units from the go vern ment bud get.5  
Thus the re are so me avai la ble fi nan cial po ten tials that 
the MF, in col la bo ra tion with the CNB, co uld use, pri ma-
rily in the way of in ve sting bud ge tary sur plu ses on the 
mo ney mar ket, as well as a re so ur ce for ma king short-
term loans to bud ge tary and ex tra-bud ge tary spen ding 
agen cies, which, in stead of the banks, wo uld be aut ho-
ri sed by the Trea sury of the MF, na tu rally, with lower 
ra tes of in te rest, and co uld use them as an in stru ment 
for the in tro duc tion of fi scal di sci pli ne.
The Croa tian Po stal Bank – from fi scal 
agent of the go vern ment to a ge nui ne 
com mer cial bank
Anot her pro blem for the go vern ment fi nan ces con sists 
of go vern ment de po sits at the CPB in stead of their 
being con so li da ted in the SAT at the CNB. For sin ce 
2001 the CPB has be co me a fi scal agent of the go vern-
ment, via which out go ing pay ments are ma de from the 
tran sac tion ac co unts of go vern ment in sti tu tions to end 
users. Ne vert he less, de po sits are al so to be fo und in the 
go vern ment ac co unts in the CPB. Alt ho ugh we do not 
ha ve up-to-da te in for ma tion abo ut the ba lan ce of go vern-
ment de po sits in the CPB, the fi gu res from the graph 4 
are in di ca ti ve eno ugh.
5 It is possible, for example, for the government to allocate grants to local 
units that have enough unused monetary resources in their own accounts 
already (see Bajo, A., 2004).
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Graph 5  Short term go vern ment bor rowing ver sus the ba lan ce of the cen tral bud get (daily ave ra ge at 
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bud get.
So ur ce: MF Re pu blic of Croa tia 2005
Go vern ment de po sits in the CPB in crea sed from 26 mil-
lion in 2001 to abo ut 1.3 bil lion in 2002. The CPB plan-
ned for go vern ment de po sits in 2003 of ap proxi ma tely 
1.2 bil lion ku na. It sho uld be po in ted out that de po sits 
in the CPB are an in te gral part of the go vern ment de po-
sits in the SAT at the CNB, but only on pa per, and not 
in rea lity. Be ca u se cash flow and liqui dity are not ma na-
ged, the MF uses CPB de po sits as a loan po ten tial for 
the short-term fi nan cing of the go vern ment in co njunc-
tion with mar ket con di tions, that is, at mar ket ra tes of 
in te rest.
Cen tral bud get short-term bor rowing
For a com ple te over view of the si tua tion of the liqui dity 
of the cen tral bud get, it is ne ce ssary to de ter mi ne the 
ave ra ge ba lan ce of liquid re so ur ces, and of short-term 
loans for the sa ke of liqui dity that the MF ta kes di rectly 
from the com mer cial banks and to a smal ler de gree on 
the mo ney mar ket (graph 5).
In te re stingly eno ugh, the MF (cen tral bud get) in 2002 
had at the monthly le vel abo ut 324 mil lion ku na daily 
at its di spo sal, which it co uld use as a sur plus of liquid 
funds and lay them out on the mo ney mar ket. Howe ver, 
in spi te of the liquid funds, the MF di rectly bor rowed 
from the com mer cial banks, by an ave ra ge of 89 mil-
lion ku na.  In 2003 the MF had 196 mil lion ku na at its 
di spo sal and yet at the sa me ti me took on loans at com-
mer cial banks of 103 mil lion ku na. In 2004 the ave ra-
ge daily ba lan ce on the go vern ment ac co unt was 214 
mil lion ku na, and yet the MF took on loans to the tu ne 
of 173 mil lion ku na. In ot her words, short term loans 
that the sta te ta kes on from the banks are smal ler than 
the avai la ble mo ne tary re so ur ces of the go vern ment. 
In such con di tions it can be ex pec ted that the MF, apart 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Outturn 2001 . 
Estimate 2002
Plan 2003  
Household Corporate Public sector Other deposits
So ur ce: CPB, 2003
Graph 4 Struc tu re of de po sits in the CPB from 2001 to 2003 (in bil lion ku na)
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from bor rowing on the Za greb mo ney mar ket, will bor-
row grea ter amo unts at the com mer cial banks as well, 
mainly from the lar gest. Still, let us look at the amo-
unt of in te rest on short-term bud get bor rowings on the 
mo ney mar ket and di rectly (for lar ger amo unts) at the 
com mer cial banks (graph 6).
And in deed, the in te rest ra tes on the short-term loans 
that the MF ta kes di rectly from the fo ur ma jor banks 
and the sta te-ow ned CPB are lar ger than tho se on the 
Za greb Mo ney Mar ket.  The dif fe ren ce in the se in te-
rests in 2003 ca me to abo ut 1%, in fa vo ur of di rect 
loans from the com mer cial banks, with the pro vi so that 
in 2004 the go vern ment on the who le took out short-
term loans only from com mer cial banks at an ave ra ge 
in te rest ra te of 7%. Howe ver, this per haps wo uld not be 
a pro blem if the in te rest ra tes on the short term loans 
of go vern ment and of ot her in sti tu tio nal sec tors, pri ma-
rily the re tail and cor po ra te sec tors, we re not prac ti cally 
iden ti cal (graph 7).
Alt ho ugh up to Ju ne 2003 the re we re dif fe ren ces, 
from that da te the in te rest ra tes in co njunc tion with the 
fo reign cur rency cla u se on short-term loans and the in te-
rest ra tes on go vern ment short-term loans with no cur-
rency cla u se (our po int of de par tu re being the naï ve 
assump tion that a short term loan to the go vern ment is 
at ten ded with the lowest risk) are al most iden ti cal. In 
2004 and 2005 the re we re on ave ra ge abo ut 7%. This 
shows that the fi nan cial mar ket does not re cog ni se dif fe-
ren ces in the qua li ties of in di vi dual deb tors, cla ssifying 
them mo re or less all the sa me, with iden ti cal de grees 
of risk. But clearly the re is a pro blem for the go vern-
ment in the fi nan cing of short-term loans, and so a lit-
tle mo re sho uld be said abo ut the na tu re of the short-
term pu blic debt.
Graph 7 In te rest ra tes on short-term loans per in sti tu tio nal sec tor – fo reign cur rency cla u se (in %)
Graph 6 In te rest ra tes on di rect bank loans and in te rest ra tes on the Za greb Mo ney Mar ket (in %)
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The na tu re of the short-term pu blic debt
Par ti cu larly sin ce 2001, the go vern ment has ta ken on 
short-term debt in two ways6. By the issue of trea sury 
bills and by di rect loans from com mer cial banks. It is 
a fact that the lar gest part of the short-term debt has 
been crea ted by the issue of trea sury bills. Thus we 
sho uld look at the amo unt of in te rest on trea sury bills 
ac cor ding to ma tu rity da tes (graph 8).
The MF is lengt he ning the pe riods for the re demp tion 
of trea sury bills. From 1996, when it first issued trea-
sury bills, the MF bor rowed at 42, 91 and 182 day 
pe riods and in 2002 went over to a pe riod of 364 days. 
At the sa me ti me, the ave ra ge ra te of in te rest on trea-
sury bills was re du ced from a high 11% in 1996 to 
abo ut 6% in 2005. The re duc tion of in te rest ra tes led 
to mo re fa vo u ra ble terms of short-term bor rowing, as 
well as a lar ge in crea se in the short-term debt crea ted 
by the issue of trea sury bills. The ove rall short-term 
debt of the go vern ment has mar kedly in crea sed sin ce 
1993, as shown by the graph 9.
To tal go vern ment short-term debt in crea sed from 517 
mil lion ku na in 1993 to as much as 17 bil lion ku na 
in 2005, and this can in all ho nesty be cal led long-
term. The go vern ment crea tes the ma jor part of its 
short-term debt by the issue of trea sury bills, which 
in crea sed from 272 mil lion in 1996 to as much as 13 
Graph 9 Short-term cen tral bud get debt from 1993 to 2005 (in bil lion ku na)
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6 A third category could be due and still outstanding liabilities of spend-
ing agencies.
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bil lion ku na in 2005. Howe ver, the growth in the ove-
rall short-term debt is par tially the con sequen ce of 
the in crea sed amo unts of loans for liqui dity (mainly 
for pen sions) that the MF ta kes on from the com mer-
cial banks. Liqui dity loans in crea sed from 620 mil lion 
ku na in 2000 to 3.9 bil lion ku na in 2005. The ex plo-
sion in short-term bor rowing be ca u se the MF does not 
ma na ge its liqui dity and cash flow bro ught the MF 
to the po int at which it ul ti ma tely had to turn do u ble 
short-term debts in to one long-term debt, be ca u se of 
which it sells bonds on the do me stic and fo reign mar-
ket. Thus in April 2005, in or der to set tle its short-term 
debts to the banks, the go vern ment issued bonds in the 
amo unt of 3.5 bil lion ku na, which is abo ut 90% of the 
di rect short-term debt (loans) of the sta te to do me stic 
com mer cial banks. The Go vern ment and the MF ad du-
ced as rea sons for the se new bor rowings “fi nan cing of 
the or derly exe cu tion of the bud get”, which is really 
not hing el se but bor rowing to fi nan ce cur rent bud ge-
tary ex pen di tu res, on the who le for pen sions. In such 
con di tions the que stion ari ses as to who in the MF 
is ma na ging, as well as cash flow and liqui dity, the 
pu blic debt. Un for tu na tely, the re is no po int in wri ting 
at the pre sent mo ment of pu blic debt ma na ge ment. The 
si tua tion is just the sa me as liqui dity and cash flow 
ma na ge ment – it does not exist at all.
Who ma na ges cash flow and liqui dity 
of the cen tral bud get?
In few co un tries that are aspi ring to en ter the EU is the-
re no col la bo ra tion between cen tral bank and the MF 
in the ma na ge ment of fi scal and mo ne tary po licy, par-
ti cu larly in that part that re la tes to the con trol of cash 
flows in the go vern ment ac co unts and to the daily, 
weekly and monthly ma na ge ment of the mo ney po ten-
tial of the go vern ment. In Croa tia, in May 2005, the 
CNB, wit ho ut in vol ving the MF, ma de a de ci sion to 
in crea se the ra te of man da tory re ser ves, alt ho ugh such 
a de ci sion can ha ve a di rect im pact on the con di tions 
un der which the go vern ment has to bor row (the in te-
rest ra tes). Why do the chief fi nan cial in sti tu tions char-
ged with the sta bi lity of the go vern ment or sta te fi nan-
ces not col la bo ra te, main tai ning an ap pro pria te le vel 
of bud ge tary de fi cit and pu blic debt, as well as pri-
ce and exc han ge ra te sta bi lity? The main pro blem is 
that the ma na ge ment of go vern ment cash flows and 
liqui dity is not in the hands of the MF or the CNB 
but has been sur ren de red to the (on the who le the big-
gest) com mer cial banks, in which the ma jor parts of 
the go vern ment de po sits are kept, par ti cu larly tho se 
of the EBFs.
The MF and the Go vern ment, sin ce 2001 at least 
(when short-term bor rowing at the CNB was for bid-
den) sho uld ha ve be co me qui te awa re that the func-
tions of the exe cu tion of the bud get and the ma na ge-
ment of cash flows and liqui dity are at the heart of the 
bud ge tary sy stem and that im pro ve ments in them can 
lead to a slow-down in the growth of the pu blic debt, 
even of pu blic spen ding. Un for tu na tely, sin ce the MF 
still does not ma na ge the de po sits (of the EBFs and 
the lo cal go vern ment units, prin ci pally) and liqui dity 
of the go vern ment bud get and be ca u se as a re sult the-
re is no col la bo ra tion between the CNB and the FM, 
con trol of cash flows has been re sig ned to the com-
mer cial banks. In such con di tions, the MF, in stead of 
being a player on the mo ney mar ket with its bud ge tary 
sur plu ses, is still bor rowing di rectly from the com mer-
cial banks, even from its own sta te-con trol led bank, 
but on mar ket con di tions.
Conc lu sion
For the MF to be able to con trol cash flow and liqui-
dity of the cen tral bud get, it is ne ce ssary for:
•  the MF and the CNB to set up a sy stem of col la bo-
ra tion in the ma na ge ment of the mo ne tary po ten tial 
of the bud get
•  the MF to set up and im pro ve its cash flow and liqui-
dity ma na ge ment and, as well as re cor ding, ac tually 
to start ma na ging the avai la ble fi nan cial po ten tial. 
This means abo ve all:
a)  in ve sting bud ge tary sur plu ses on the mo ney mar-
ket
b)  ma king loans to spen ding agen cies and the EBFs 
(in ter nal ope ra tions of the Trea sury)
c)  in agree ment with the banks, the se lec tion of the 
most fa vo u ra ble fi nan cial ser vi ces pro vi der, by 
for exam ple the ope ning of tran sac tion ac co unts
• the Go vern ment to pri va ti se the CPB
•  the Go vern ment and the MF to cen tra li sed fo reign 
cur rency de po sits in the SAT in the CNB, and for 
the MF to con so li da te EBF de po sits and start ma na-
ging them
•  lo cal go vern ment units to start ope ra ting via their 
own SATs that they ha ve to open at the CNB.
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Per haps the key issue in Croa tia is to de ve lop an awa-
re ness of the na tu re and va lue of pu blic mo ney.
Po ten tial pro blems in the rea li sa tion of the se pro po-
sals are to be fo und in the re si stan ce of the banks to 
con so li da tion of de po sits in the SAT at the CNB, the 
du bio us tech ni cal com pe ten ce of the MF for the ma na-
ge ment of cash flow and liqui dity, and to col la bo ra-
te with the CNB, the re si stan ce of spen ding agen cies 
and EBFs to ope ra ting via their SATs and cen tra li-
sed go vern ment de po sit ma na ge ment in the MF, the 
re si stan ce of lo cal go vern ment units to ope ra ting via 
their SATs in the CNB, and the ab sen ce of any po li ti-
cal will for the pri va ti sa tion of the CPB.
Key conc lu sions
•  Cash flow and liqui dity ma na ge ment can ser ve the MF 
as a means for the in tro duc tion of fi scal di sci pli ne.
•  If the go vern ment fi gu res on the Za greb Mo ney Mar-
ket thro ugh coor di na ted ac tion of the MF and the 
CNB, di rect short-term bor rowing at banks might 
be do ne away with, and mo re tran spa rent short-term 
fi nan cing of the cen tral bud get with trea sury bills 
alo ne en su red, in co njunc tion with lower costs.
•  Pri va ti sa tion of the banks does not mean a loss of 
so ve reignty in the ma na ge ment of fi scal and mo ne-
tary po licy.
•  If the MF fi gu res on the Za greb Mo ney Mar ket with 
sur plus funds, it will not (with good ma na ge ment) 
un der mi ne mo ne tary sta bi lity.
•  With good cash flow and liqui dity ma na ge ment the 
MF can help the CNB to run mo ne tary po licy, par-
ti cu larly in ma king su re of ef fec ti ve con trol of the 
cre dit po ten tial of com mer cial banks and in ma na-
ge ment of the exc han ge ra te.
•  Ope ning SATs of lo cal units in the CNB wo uld gi ve 
the MF the ca pa city to de fi ne bet ter cri te ria for the 
al lo ca tion of grants from the cen tral bud get.
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